

**LABOR PACS AND NAFTA LEGISLATORS: AN
EXAMINATION OF REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND THE
NAFTA VOTE**

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Labor PACs and NAFTA Legislators: An Examination of Reward, Punishment and the NAFTA Vote*

Abstract

Prior to the congressional vote, organized labor threatened to punish legislators who voted for NAFTA. Building on work by Engel and Jackson, I explore whether or not organized labor made good on its threat by reducing campaign contributions to Democratic House members who voted Yes. I postulate contribution functions for both Democrats and Republicans, with pre-NAFTA vote contributions on the horizontal axis and post-NAFTA vote contributions on the vertical axis. For members of both parties, I find that a Yes vote on NAFTA results in a change in the contribution function, which is a combination of a downward proportional shift and a downward parallel shift.

According to National Public Radio's Morning Edition, April 12, 2000, George Meany, ex-President of the AFL-CIO, instructed unionists on their lobbying visits to legislators to impress upon them: "We never threaten, we never beg, and we never forget."

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1. Introduction

Many scholars have conducted trade policy studies and have come to the conclusion that interest-group donations affect congressional voting (see Tosini and Tower 1987, Steagall and Jennings 1996, Baldwin and McGee 1998). However, few studies have sought to examine the reverse – whether or not a congressional vote is related to contributions received thereafter.

More specifically, few studies have asked whether interest groups use campaign contributions as a means of reward or punishment based on specific voting outcomes. In this paper, I seek to investigate this question as it applies the North American Free Trade Agreement.

1.1 *Introduction to NAFTA*

The concept of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was proposed by Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gotari in 1990. At that time, it was expected that the most formidable obstacle of the treaty would be its acceptance by the Mexican public, which had a history of distancing itself from its northern neighbor. Surprisingly, the first signs of trouble came not in Mexico but in the United States, when a coalition of labor and environmental groups sought to defeat the extension of fast track authority that President George Bush would need from Congress in order to negotiate a free trade agreement with Mexico. Although a bitter public debate ensued, by May 24th, 1991, both the House of Representatives and the Senate had voted to extend fast track for two years.

When negotiations formally began in June of 1991, it was expected that an agreement would be reached within a year. This was to limit the opportunity for a powerful opposition to organize in Mexico and to allow the United States to focus on its foremost trade issue – the conclusion of the Uruguay round of the GATT. As it turned out, the terms of NAFTA were not agreed upon until August of 1992. However, the ultimate passage of the treaty in the US would depend on the negotiation of supplemental agreements initiated in 1993 to mollify the concerns of NAFTA's most formidable opponents: organized labor and environmental groups.

In the US, labor unions and business associations mounted strong public relations campaigns relative to NAFTA. Labor unions, fearing competition from open trade with neighboring southern countries with lower costs of production, insisted that they would discontinue financial support of any congressman who supported NAFTA. Further, labor unions

asserted that they would defeat all legislators who voted for NAFTA (Steagall and Jennings, 515). Despite these threats from historical allies of the Democratic Party, NAFTA passed in the Senate without incident on November 20th, 1993 (with a vote of 61-38), after its more precarious approval by the House three days prior (with a vote of 234-200). This outcome required a Yes vote from a significant number of Democrats in the House and Senate, in addition to the expected Yes votes of the Republicans.

1.2 *Why NAFTA?*

I chose NAFTA as a case study to investigate interest group donation behavior for several reasons, primarily because of the public nature of the debate. Labor unions made defeating NAFTA one of their top priorities and mounted a strong campaign against the treaty. They were also extremely vocal about their intent to punish all legislators who did not vote against NAFTA. In the words of William Bywater (of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO), “We’re gonna whip your ass and throw you out of office” (quoted in Steagall and Jennings, 71).

NAFTA was also a convenient case study because of its timing and political circumstances. The NAFTA vote occurred in late November 1993, which means that it fell almost exactly at the mid-point of the 1993-1994 election cycle. Therefore, in looking at pre- and post-NAFTA contributions, one can examine the change in contribution levels as a function of vote and party affiliation. Finally, NAFTA was introduced into the House of Representatives under fast track authority. This meant that legislators were forced to cast a Yes or No vote without amendments, thereby sending a clear message to labor unions regarding their position on this trade issue.

2. Analysis of Labor PAC’s and Campaign Contributions

2.1 *Data Collection*

This study investigates whether labor PAC’s did in fact punish or reward politicians for their vote on NAFTA. To answer this question, an analysis of labor PAC contributions before and after the NAFTA vote was conducted.

In the analysis of Congress, the relationship between the NAFTA vote and labor PAC contributions in the Senate was excluded for two reasons. Most importantly, the treaty was

expected to pass in the Senate without any major opposition, and it seemed unlikely that labor PAC's would direct their funds toward a group in which the influence upon individual votes would be minimal. Furthermore, it was reasoned that campaign contributions to Senators would not be very sensitive to their position on any single vote, as they are re-elected every six years.

Therefore, only data for the House of Representatives was examined. Until the week before the NAFTA vote was to occur in the House, it was uncertain whether there would be sufficient votes to pass the agreement. This meant that labor PAC's had the opportunity to try to influence Representatives with their donations. Moreover, with elections every two years for the members of the House, a loss of contributions over a two-year election cycle could be very important to them.

I also had to decide how to define "Labor PACs." The data for this study was extracted from the Federal Election Commission Information page (accessible online at <http://www.tray.com>). From this source, labor PAC's are broken down into five categories: Building Trades Unions, Industrial Unions, Transportation Unions, Public Service Unions and Miscellaneous Unions. Data was compiled from all categories with the exception of Public Service and Miscellaneous. I eliminated Public Service Unions working under the assumption that its jobs were not directly threatened by Mexican labor. Miscellaneous represented a random group of unions organized by default, and therefore it seemed problematic for analysis and interpretation. Appendix A contains the detailed list of labor PACs included in this study.

Having selected the focus labor PACs, a list was generated of the number of contributions, as well as their dollar amounts, for all 435 members of the House of Representatives during the 1993-1994 election cycle. The data was then sorted and placed into separate spreadsheets for each individual congressman, which were broken down by type of labor PAC, individual PAC, and the number and dollar amounts in the pre- or post-NAFTA periods. Period 1 (pre-NAFTA) contributions were defined as those from 1/1/93 through 11/16/93, and Period 2 (post-NAFTA) contributions were defined as those from 11/17/93 through 12/31/94. After compiling data for each individual congressman, summary statistics were generated and the pattern of the association between labor PAC contributions in Period 1 before the vote and Period 2 after the vote was analyzed.

2.2 *Relevant Literature*

Engel and Jackson (1998) conducted the only previous study of the use of punishment strategies relative to the NAFTA vote. Their study examined both short- and long-term punishment strategies. Using a linear regression, EJ determined that labor PACs did indeed punish or reward congressmen in the short-term. They concluded that, on average, each Democrat who voted for NAFTA received \$25,024 less from labor PACs than did their anti-NAFTA democratic colleagues.

EJ also found that there was no statistically significant reduction in contributions to pro-NAFTA House Democrats over the 1995-1996 contribution cycle relative to contributions received by their anti-NAFTA democratic colleagues (the t value being slightly less than 1). These results lead to their conclusion that “This indicates that the stick strategy begun after the NAFTA vote was a short-term rather than a long-term punishment strategy. The reduction in funding for pro-NAFTA Democrats appears to have been a one-time occurrence”(p. 7). Thus, EJ tested the George Meany hypothesis: “We never forget,” and found it lacking.

McCloskey (1996) argued that economic significance and statistical significance are two different issues, and that the former might be more important than the latter. Her point can be constructed as particularly relevant with respect to EJ’s interpretation of non-significant long-term effects of labor PAC contributions. Their point estimate is that a Yes vote reduced campaign contributions in the 1995-96 election cycle by $\$0.000733 * \$16,490,443 = \$12,087$, which is $12,078/110,674 = 10.9\%$ of the mean labor PAC contribution received by Democrats. Thus, the magnitude of this dollar amount loss from a pro-NAFTA vote would seem to be an economically significant impact on contributions in the long-term. As George Meany might have said: “We never forget—at least over a 3 year horizon.”

This study differs from that of Engel and Jackson in several respects:

- First, only the 1993-1994 election cycle was examined, breaking all the campaign contributions into pre- and post-NAFTA vote. Whereas EJ also considered the short-term post-NAFTA vote contributions to be the second half of the 1993-1994 election cycle, their pre-NAFTA vote contributions were 1991-1992 contributions. Using data from the 1991-1992 cycle could be problematic because several other labor issues were voted on during this period, all of which might have affected the level of campaign contributions. Examples include amendments of the National Labor Relations Act (1991), the Railway Labor Act

(1991), the Civil Rights Act (1991), the Job Training Partnership Act (1991), and passage of the Trade Expansion Act (1992), the Unemployment Insurance Reform Act (1992), and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (1992). Perhaps most significantly, fast track was voted on in 1991. One can be confident that the money from the 1993-1994 contribution period was directed primarily at the NAFTA campaign. Therefore, the key distinction between these studies is that in looking at pre-NAFTA contributions, I considered the first half of the 1993-1994 election cycle and compared it to the second half of the same cycle, whereas EJ compared the entire 1991-1992 election cycle to the second half of 1993-1994.

- Second, EJ modeled a Yes vote on NAFTA as shifting labor PAC contributions downward by a fixed amount, whereas this study explored both proportional and parallel downward shifts in the labor PAC contribution function, where the contribution function is defined as the relationship between the post-NAFTA contributions on the vertical axis and pre-NAFTA contributions on the horizontal axis.
- Third, whereas EJ only investigated incumbent Democrats, all Republicans and Democrats receiving contributions were included in this study.

There have been several studies conducted on the subject of pre-NAFTA PAC contributions and their effect on the NAFTA vote. Kahane (1996) and Steagall and Jennings (1996) addressed the NAFTA vote specifically and concluded that interest group contributions had an effect on congressional voting behavior. Kahane's study used a single-equation logit regression for both the House and the Senate to argue their point, while Steagall and Jennings used a single-equation probit regression in the House only. In a distinctive study, Baldwin and Magee (1998) also examined this relationship, recognizing that campaign contributions are endogenous. Using probit analysis, they concluded that "trade policy is for sale" in the House of Representatives (21). They drew this conclusion from their results that indicated:

A \$1000 increase in a member's contributions from labor groups beyond the mean level increased the probability of voting against NAFTA by 0.4 percentage points ... a rather large impact on voting probabilities considering that the standard deviation of labor contributions is \$61,000 in our data set (Baldwin and Magee, 20).

Baldwin and Magee also assert that "[I]nterest groups are buying something when they contribute to a politician's campaign" (1). Using this analogy, shoppers who go to a particular store and find that they can no longer purchase a desired product will take their money

elsewhere. This prediction sets the stage for my inquiry, which seeks to investigate whether voting behavior affects post-vote campaign contributions.

3. Analysis of Data

3.1 Anticipated Results

The NAFTA vote came at an important time in US history. Bill Clinton had just been elected into the Presidency and Democrats had a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Therefore, Democrats had the unusual fortune of having control of both the Executive and the Legislative branches of government. This presented an interesting predicament for labor PAC's because although they may have wished to make good on their threats to punish those who voted for NAFTA, almost half of those people who fell into that category were Democrats, and it would not be in the best interests of the labor PACs to weaken the position of their historical allies. Therefore, in examining the results, one might expect that contributions for Democrats who voted against NAFTA would not decrease by a substantial amount.

If the NAFTA vote did produce a noticeable effect on contributions, one might postulate that it would be more pronounced among Republicans. Although in absolute terms campaign contributions to Republicans were relatively inconsequential (due to the fact that there were fewer Republicans allied with labor interests), one might predict that labor PACs would reward anti-NAFTA Republicans in the period following the vote. One might not expect as much punishment among Republicans given that they were already receiving such low levels of contributions.

Finally, it is important to remember that contributions to politicians are endogenous (Chappell, 1982). Taking this into consideration, labor PACs tend to allocate money to politicians – regardless of their party – who are allied with their interests, and may be hesitant to break such alliances over any one particular vote.

In sum, it is expected that labor unions will use a short-term punishment strategy relative to the NAFTA vote. Among Democrats, we might anticipate more punishment, as labor has reason to expect their support. Among Republicans, we might foresee a short-term reward for those who jumped over to support the labor cause.

3.2 Results of Data Compilation

NAFTA passed in the House of Representatives with a vote of 234 to 200. Of the Ayes, 132 were Republicans and 102 were Democrats. Of the Noes, there were 43 were Republicans, 156 were Democrats, and one was an Independent. Table 1 summarizes this information and indicates the number of congressmen who received contributions from labor PACs.

Table 1. Summary of Pre- and Post-NAFTA Labor PAC Contributions.

Party – Vote	Vote	Number of contributions	Pre-NAFTA dollar amount	Post-NAFTA dollar Amount	Total dollar amount
Republican – Yes	132	48	\$82,975	\$129,950	\$212,925
Republican – No	43	37	\$83,578	\$235,169	\$318,747
Democrat – Yes	103	88	\$1,014,522	\$1,827,797	\$2,842,319
Democrat – No	156	145	\$2,938,776	\$7,300,040	\$10,238,816
Independent – No	1	1	\$4,000	\$92,700	\$96,700
TOTAL	435	319	\$4,123,851	\$9,585,656	\$13,709,507

It is interesting to note that of Republicans who voted Yes, only 36% received contributions, while 86% of those voting No got money. Of the Democrats, 85% who voted Yes received donations in contrast to 92% of those who voted No. Note that of the 43 Republicans who voted No, 23 had no contributions prior to NAFTA, but received money *after* the vote. Finally, whereas both groups of Republicans had similar initial contribution levels, a Yes vote increased receipts by 1.6 times the initial level, whereas a No vote saw receipts increase by 2.8 times.

Tables 2 and 3 show the data separated into pre- and post-NAFTA periods respectively. In considering that there is an overall increase in contribution receipts by a factor of 8.1 from the pre- to the post-NAFTA period, several observations can be made. It seems that Republicans who voted No and Democrats who voted Yes were particularly affected in their contribution receipts, receiving a 53.4 percent increase and 6.8 percent decrease, respectively. Republicans who voted Yes seemed relatively unaffected by their vote in that their receipts increased slightly, as would be expected. However, Democrats who voted No were heartily rewarded relative to their fellow party members who voted for the treaty, registering \$17,398 more than Democrats who cast an affirmative vote.

Table 2: The Pre-NAFTA Contribution Period

Party/Vote	Voters	Number of legislators receiving contributions	Percentage receiving contributions (%)	Total Amount of contributions	Average contribution per legislator	Maximum contribution to any legislator
Rep / Yes	132	29	22	\$83,000	\$2,862	\$8,500
Rep / No	43	14	32.6	\$83,600	\$5,971	\$18,200
Dem / Yes	103	86	83.6	\$1,015,000	\$11,802	\$124,600
Dem / No	156	136	87.2	\$2,939,000	\$21,610	\$137,000
Ind / No	1	1	100	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$4,000
Total	435	266	61.1	\$4,124,000	\$15,504	\$137,000

Table 3: The Post-NAFTA Contribution Period

Party/Vote	Number of legislators receiving contributions	Percentage receiving contributions (%)	Total Amount of contributions	Average contribution per legislator	Maximum contribution to any legislator
Rep / Yes	39	29.5	\$130,000	\$3,333	\$20,700
Rep / No	37	86	\$235,000	\$6,351	\$32,600
Dem / Yes	79	76.7	\$1,828,000	\$23,139	\$108,000
Dem / No	145	92.9	\$7,300,000	\$50,345	\$127,400
Ind / No	1	100	\$92,700	\$92,700	\$92,700
Total	301	69.2	\$9,586,000	\$31,847	\$127,400

Table 4: Comparison Between Pre- and Post-NAFTA Contribution Periods

Party/Vote	Difference between post- and pre-NAFTA contributions (%)	Ratio of post-NAFTA contributions to pre-NAFTA contributions	Difference between post- and pre-NAFTA average contribution per legislator	Post- to pre-NAFTA ratio of average contribution per legislator
Rep / Yes	7.5	1.34	\$471	1.165
Rep / No	53.4	2.64	\$380	1.064
Dem / Yes	-6.8	0.92	\$11,337	1.961
Dem / No	5.7	1.07	\$28,735	2.33
Ind / No	0	1	\$88,700	23.175
Total	8.1	1.13	\$16,343	2.054

3.3 Regression Results

A complete set of the data is given in Appendix B. To determine statistical significance, three regressions were run for both Republicans (Rep1-3) and Democrats (Dem1-3), and a fourth for just the Republicans (Rep4):

$$1) \text{ Post-NAFTA contributions} = \mathbf{a} \text{ Yes} + \mathbf{b} \text{ Pre-NAFTA contributions} + \mathbf{g}(\text{Yes} * \text{Pre-NAFTA contributions}) + \text{constant}$$

$$2) \text{ Post-NAFTA contributions} = \mathbf{a} \text{ Yes} + \mathbf{b} \text{ Pre-NAFTA contributions} + \mathbf{g}(\text{Yes} * \text{Pre-NAFTA contributions}) + \mathbf{d}(\text{Pre-NAFTA contributions})^2 + \text{constant}$$

$$3) \text{ Post-NAFTA contributions} = \mathbf{a} \text{ Yes} + \mathbf{b} \text{ Pre-NAFTA contributions} + \text{constant}$$

$$4) \text{ Post-NAFTA contributions} = \mathbf{b} \text{ Pre-NAFTA contributions} + \mathbf{g}(\text{Yes} * \text{Pre-NAFTA contributions}) + \mathbf{d}(\text{Pre-NAFTA contributions})^2 + \text{constant}$$

As the regression equations listed above and Table 5 indicate:

- The dependent variable is post-NAFTA labor PAC contributions to individual House members in thousands of dollars.

The independent variables are:

- Yes, a dummy variable, where Yes = 1 for a Yes vote on NAFTA and Yes = 0 for a No vote;
- Pre-NAFTA labor PAC contributions, in thousands of dollars;
- Yes * Pre-NAFTA contributions, which has a value of zero for members who vote No, and a value of the pre-NAFTA contribution for members who vote Yes; and
- Pre-NAFTA contributions², which reflects the tendency for members who received very large contributions in the pre-NAFTA period to receive markedly smaller contributions in the second period.

Table 5 summarizes the results of the seven regression models. All models fit the data reasonably well, accounting for between 40% and 70% of the variance of the dependent variable depending upon the individual regression equation. The best equations are Dem2 for the Democrats and Rep2 for the Republicans, using the adjusted R² as the criterion.

Table 5: OLS REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING POST-NAFTA VOTE LABOR PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGISLATORS

Equation	Dem1	Dem2	Dem3	Rep1	Rep2	Rep3	Rep4
Independent Variable							
Yes	-18.3*** (-4.54)	-12.1*** (-3.37)	-21.6*** (-6.66)	-1.51* (-2.44)	-1.07 (-1.76)	-2.22*** (-3.75)	—
Pre-NAFTA contributions	0.907*** (8.77)	2.20*** (12.9)	0.831*** (9.49)	1.95*** (15.9)	3.02*** (9.87)	1.72*** (17.0)	3.19*** (11.0)
Yes * Pre-NAFTA contributions	-0.264 (-1.37)	-0.283 (-1.68)	—	-0.656** (-3.14)	-1.21*** (-4.86)	—	-1.38*** (-6.04)
Pre-NAFTA contributions ²	—	-0.0140*** (-8.99)	—	—	-0.0789*** (-3.78)	—	-0.0859*** (-4.17)
Constant	29.7*** (10.7)	15.3*** (5.28)	31.1*** (12.1)	1.68** (3.10)	1.16* (2.15)	2.12*** (3.94)	0.324 (1.26)
R ²	0.411	0.553	0.407	0.687	0.712	0.669	0.706
Adjusted R ²	0.404	0.546	0.402	0.682	0.705	0.665	0.701
Observations	259	259	259	175	175	175	175

¹ Significance of the coefficients is denoted by:

- *** p<.001 (two tailed test),
- ** p<.01 (two tailed test),
- * p<.05 (two tailed test).

In each cell, the top figure is the coefficient, in thousands of dollars. The bottom figure is the t statistic.

The regression equations are best explained by focusing on Dem2, which contains all the independent variables above. Predicted post-NAFTA contributions for a Democrat who voted No are $[(2.2 * \text{first period contributions}) - (.0140 * \text{first period contributions}^2) + \$15,300]$. A Democratic Yes voter's predicted post-NAFTA contributions are the same as above, except that they are *reduced* by $[\$12,100 + 0.283 * \text{first period contributions}]$.

Thus, the cost of voting Yes is higher for those Democrats, and increases relative to contributions they received from labor PACs in the pre-NAFTA period. The cost of a Yes vote measured as a reduction in post-NAFTA contributions is \$12,100 plus an additional $.283 * 18.8 = \$5,300$ for the Democrat who receives the mean first period contribution for No voters. For a member who receives the maximum contribution of \$137,000 in the first period, the cost of a Yes vote is an additional \$38,800. Assuming that members anticipated this pattern of contributions, it is not surprising that Democratic Yes voters tended to receive smaller first period contributions than did Democratic No voters.

Conceptually, we can think of the regression equation as defining a second period contribution function, with second period contributions measured on the Y axis and first period contributions measured on the X axis. A Democratic Yes vote results in a downward parallel shift of the contribution function by 12.1 thousand dollars plus a further downward shift of 28.3% times first period contributions – a proportional downward shift – where the proportion is expressed as a fraction of the X variable.

Thus, we can think of first period contributions not as buying votes, but rather as providing the basis of a threat to Yes voters. While George Meany's lobbyists did not threaten legislators verbally, perhaps their contributions spoke so loudly that there was no need for threatening words.

For the Democrats, four of the variables are significantly different from zero on a two-tailed *t* test at the 0.001 level. The proportional shift variable is not significant on a two-tailed test even at the 0.05 level. I explored alternative parameter specifications in Dem1 and Dem3. These alternatives leave out some of the independent variables, but neither of them generate such high adjusted R^2 , so Dem2 remains our preferred model.

Similar results apply to the equations for Republicans, Rep1 through Rep4. As we found for the Democrats, Rep2 is our preferred equation. For the Republicans, all terms achieved statistical significance with the exception of the Yes variable in the second regression model and the constant in Rep4. Although seven regression models were run, it is important to recognize that they are all fundamentally quite similar, and the fact that all produce comparable results indicates that our conclusions are robust with respect to alternative specifications.

4. Conclusion

In a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal*, columnist Albert R. Hunt points out some of the inconsistencies that exist between members of the Democratic Party and the voting records of those legislators who represent them (“A Paper Tiger on Trade,” A23, March 23, 2000). What is the wedge that can account for this gap? Evidence points to labor PAC contributions. Because of the financial importance that labor contributions play – particularly in Democratic campaigns – many scholars have made the connection between donations and roll-call voting. This paper further investigates the relationship between labor PACs and congressmen, and answers the

question of whether PACs use their dollars as part of a punishment or reward strategy. As the data clearly indicates, the answer is a resounding yes. In this study, punishment manifests itself as both a parallel shift and proportional shift downward. Therefore, with reference to George Meany's quote, it would seem that although labor unions do threaten, at least in the short-term, "they never forget."

Appendix A: Labor PAC's Included in this Study

Building Trades PAC Name

Aluminum, Brick, Glass Workers International PAC
Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council
California State Pipe Trades Council Voluntary PAF
Carpenters Federal PAC
Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee (United Bro. of C&J of A.)
Composition Roofers Union
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators PAC
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers in SP, BKMTHS etc.
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers, etc.
International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades PAC
International U. of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen PAC
International Union of Operating Engineers - Local 15
International Union of Operating Engineers - Local 18 - Pol. Ed. Patterns
International Union of Operating Engineers - Local 68
International Union of Operating Engineers - Local 825
International Union of Operating Engineers - PEC
Int'l Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades
Iron Workers Political Action League
Laborers' International Union of North America - Western Political League
Laborers' Political League of North America
PAF - International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 126
PEF of the Building and Construction Trades Dept.
Plasterers and Cements Masons' Action Committee
Plumbers & Steamfitters Union
Plumbers and Fitters Union - Local Number 675
Plumbers and Pipefitters PAC - Local Number 9
Rhode Island Bricklayers PAC
Sheet Metal Workers International Association PAL
Sheet Metal Workers Political Education Ass.
Southern CA - Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee
Steamfitter PAC - Local Number 475
Supporters of Engineers Local 3 Endorsed Candidates
UA Local 85 PAC
United Association PEC

Industrial Union PAC Name

CWA - COPE Political Contributions Committee
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
American Radio Association
Chicago and Central States Unite PEC
Gas Workers Local 5-6
Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union
International Brotherhood of Electrical Engineers CPE
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers CPE

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 41
International Union of EE Salaried Machine/Furniture Workers
Int'l Chemical Workers Union Investment in Labor Education
IUE CPE U./ Electrical Tech. Salaried Machine Workers
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International U. PEF
U. of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees
United Auto Workers Voluntary Community Action
United Communications Workers of America
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers
United Mine Workers of America - Coal Miners PAC
United Paperworkers International Union PEC
United Steel Workers of America PAF
Utility Workers of America PCC

Transportation Union PAC Name

Air Line Pilots Association PAC
Allied Pilots Association PAC
Amalgamated Transit Union - COPE
Association of Flight Attendants PAC
Association of Professional Flight Attendants PAC
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers PAC
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen PAC
Democratic Republican Independent Voter Committee
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
International Longshore and Warehouse Union PAF
International Longshoremen's Association - AFL-CIO
International Longshoremen's Association -Local 1814
Maintenance of Way Political League
National Air Traffic Controllers Association PAC
Responsible Citizens Political League - Trans. Com. Int'l U.
Teamsters Local 745 Drive
Transport Workers Union PCC
Transportation Trades Department AFL-CIO PAC
United Transportation Union (UTU) Political Education League
United Pilots PAC

- **All major PAC's included in this study are above. Please note that no local divisions of national labor organizations are included in the interest of space, however they are available upon request.**

Appendix B: Aggregate Data

Candidate's Name	State	Ind	Rep	Dem	Vote Yes	Vote No	Pre-NAFTA Contributions (dollars)	Post-NAFTA Contributions (dollars)	Total Labor Contributions (dollars)
Archer, William	TX		1		1		0	1000	1000
Armey, Richard	TX		1		1		0	1000	1000
Baker, Bill	CA		1		1		500	0	500
Barrett, William	NE		1		1		1000	0	1000
Boehlert, Sherwood	NY		1		1		6500	15300	21800
Callahan, H.L.	AL		1		1		500	500	1000
Camp, David	MI		1		1		0	500	500
Clinger, William	PA		1		1		2200	3800	6000
Crane, Philip	IL		1		1		0	250	250
DeLay, Thomas	TX		1		1		0	1500	1500
Duncan, John	TN		1		1		1000	1000	2000
Dunn, Jennifer	WA		1		1		1500	1500	3000
Ewing, Thomas	IL		1		1		0	500	500
Fields, Jack	TX		1		1		4500	2500	7000
Fish, Hamilton	NY		1		1		4500	1000	5500
Fowler, Tillie	FL		1		1		0	1000	1000
Franks, Bob	NJ		1		1		2600	20750	23350
Gallo, Dean	NJ		1		1		3625	6000	9625
Gilchrest, Wayne	MD		1		1		2500	0	2500
Gillmor, Paul	OH		1		1		250	0	250
Gingrich, Newt	GA		1		1		3000	5500	8500
Hastert, JD	IL		1		1		0	2250	2250
Hobson, David	OH		1		1		1000	0	1000
Houghton, Amory	NY		1		1		2000	500	2500
Hyde, Henry	IL		1		1		0	1000	1000
Johnson, Nancy	CT		1		1		7500	1000	8500
Johnson, Sam	TX		1		1		0	1000	1000
King, Peter	NY		1		1		8500	12000	20500
Lazio, Rick	NY		1		1		8000	13600	21600
Levy, David	NY		1		1		3500	4000	7500
Lewis, Jerry	CA		1		1		0	2000	2000
Lightfoot, James	IA		1		1		500	1000	1500
Machtley, Ronald	RI		1		1		1500	0	1500
Manzullo, Donald	IL		1		1		0	500	500
McCrery, James	LA		1		1		0	1000	1000

McDade, Joseph	PA		1		1	7000	8500	15500
Molinari, Susan	NY		1		1	1000	0	1000
Moorhead, Carlos	CA		1		1	0	1000	1000
Morella, Constance	MD		1		1	1000	2500	3500
Petri, Thomas	WI		1		1	0	1500	1500
Quillen, James	TN		1		1	2800	4000	6800
Ramstad, James	MN		1		1	1000	0	1000
Roth, Toby	WI		1		1	0	500	500
Roukema, Marge	NJ		1		1	1000	0	1000
Thomas, Bill	CA		1		1	0	1000	1000
Walker, Robert	PA		1		1	0	1000	1000
Wolf, Frank	VA		1		1	2500	5500	8000
Zeliff, William	NH		1		1	0	1000	1000
TOTAL - R.Y			48		48	82975	129950	212925
Andrews, Michael	TX		1		1	8750	2200	10950
Bacchus, James	FL		1		1	21000	2500	23500
Baesler, Scotty	KY		1		1	0	8500	8500
Becerra, Xavier	CA		1		1	21200	17450	38650
Berman, Howard	CA		1		1	22700	12000	34700
Brewster, Billy	OK		1		1	1500	9000	10500
Brown, George	CA		1		1	20500	31300	51800
Bryant, John	TX		1		1	6500	42200	48700
Cantwell, Maria	WA		1		1	25250	83900	109150
Cardin, Benjamin	MD		1		1	6750	9750	16500
Chapman, Jim	TX		1		1	4000	6950	10950
Clement, Robert	TN		1		1	20250	15500	35750
Coleman, Ronald	TX		1		1	16250	72500	88750
Coppersmith, Sam	AZ		1		1	14000	0	14000
Darden, George	GA		1		1	1000	11500	12500
de la Garza, E.	TX		1		1	250	500	750
Deal, Nathan	GA		1		1	6200	0	6200
Dicks, Norman	WA		1		1	14500	21200	35700
Dooley, Calvin	CA		1		1	1000	2500	3500
Durbin, Richard	IL		1		1	21900	34600	56500
Edwards, Chet	TX		1		1	10000	6500	16500
English, Glenn	OK		1		1	500	1000	1500
English, Karan	AZ		1		1	18200	64600	82800
Eshoo, Anna	CA		1		1	7000	11000	18000
Farr, Sam	CA		1		1	124638	17200	141838
Fazio, Vic	CA		1		1	24800	62750	87550
Flake, Floyd	NY		1		1	10200	3200	13400
Foley, Thomas	WA		1		1	20000	108000	128000
Ford, Harold	TN		1		1	19500	20500	40000
Frost, Martin	TX		1		1	53998	66500	120498
Geren, Peter	TX		1		1	2000	3000	5000
Gibbons, Samuel	FL		1		1	3000	6000	9000

Glickman, Dan	KS			1	1		9500	16150	25650
Gordon, Bart	TN			1	1		27500	66000	93500
Hamilton, Lee	IN			1	1		1000	13550	14550
Hastings, Alcee	FL			1	1		9000	9000	18000
Hayes, James	LA			1	1		5500	4500	10000
Hefner, WG	NC			1	1		11500	34250	45750
Hoagland, Peter	NE			1	1		21500	60850	82350
Hoyer, Steny	MD			1	1		31400	57330	88730
Inslee, Jay	WA			1	1		11700	45850	57550
Jefferson, William	LA			1	1		10000	4600	14600
Johnson, Don	GA			1	1		1850	13200	15050
Johnson, Eddie	TX			1	1		7500	14250	21750
Johnston, Harry	FL			1	1		9000	25000	34000
Kennedy, Joseph	MA			1	1		31900	25950	57850
Kopetski, Michael	OR			1	1		8000	67	8067
Kreidler, Mike	WA			1	1		4950	53750	58700
Lambert, Blanche	AR			1	1		6000	8000	14000
Laughlin, Gregory	TX			1	1		14500	7250	21750
Lehman, Richard	CA			1	1		14500	31950	46450
Lloyd, Maralyn	TN			1	1		10000	0	10000
Lowey, Nita	NY			1	1		15500	18050	33550
Mann, David	OH			1	1		4750	12500	17250
Matsui, Robert	CA			1	1		8750	10950	19700
McCurdy, David	OK			1	1		1000	500	1500
McDermott, James	WA			1	1		7500	10700	18200
Meek, Carrie	FL			1	1		12000	12700	24700
Mineta, Norman	CA			1	1		38136	46900	85036
Moran, James	VA			1	1		14250	52100	66350
Ortiz, Solomon	TX			1	1		1500	2000	3500
Parker, Paul	MS			1	1		500	0	500
Pastor, Ed	AZ			1	1		9000	28250	37250
Payne, Lewis	VA			1	1		3500	11000	14500
Pelosi, Nancy	CA			1	1		6000	14250	20250
Penny, Timothy	MN			1	1		2500	0	2500
Pickett, Owen	VA			1	1		1000	1000	2000
Price, David	NC			1	1		7250	36000	43250
Reynolds, Mel	IL			1	1		9000	4250	13250
Rose, Charles	NC			1	1		7000	6000	13000
Rotenkowski, Dan	IL			1	1		5000	21000	26000
Rowland, JR	GA			1	1		1500	0	1500
Roybacl-Allard, Luc.	CA			1	1		5500	9000	14500
Sarpalius, Bill	TX			1	1		6500	17700	24200
Sawyer, Thomas	OH			1	1		3500	38500	42000
Schroeder, Patricia	CO			1	1		0	3250	3250
Shepard, Karen	UT			1	1		22750	60950	83700
Skaggs, David	CO			1	1		8000	57250	65250
Skelton, Ike	MO			1	1		1500	5000	6500
Smith, Neal	IA			1	1		3500	43700	47200

Spratt, John	SC			1	1		2000	3500	5500
Studds, Gerry	MA			1	1		15150	15000	30150
Tanner, John	TN			1	1		1500	0	1500
Tejeda, Frank	TX			1	1		1000	0	1000
Thornton, Raymond	AR			1	1		5500	14500	20000
Torres, Estaban	CA			1	1		2650	5500	8150
Valentine, Tim	NC			1	1		1000	0	1000
Wyden, Ronald	OR			1	1		4700	20000	24700
TOTAL - D.Y				88	88		1014522	1827797	2842319
Bartlett, Roscoe	MD		1			1	0	500	500
Bentley, Helen	MD		1			1	5650	500	6150
Bilirakis, Michael	FL		1			1	0	500	500
Blute, Peter	MA		1			1	1200	500	1700
Bunning, James	KY		1			1	0	500	500
Burton, Daniel	IN		1			1	0	500	500
Canady, Charles	FL		1			1	0	500	500
Collins, Mac	GA		1			1	0	4500	4500
Crapo, Michael	ID		1			1	0	500	500
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	FL		1			1	8500	22000	30500
Doolittle, John	CA		1			1	0	500	500
Everett, Terry	AL		1			1	0	500	500
Gallegly, Elton	CA		1			1	0	500	500
Gilman, Benjamin	NY		1			1	18200	32650	50850
Hunter, Duncan	CA		1			1	2000	1000	3000
Kingston, Jack	GA		1			1	0	500	500
McHugh, John	NY		1			1	1500	28050	29550
Mica, John	FL		1			1	0	500	500
Myers, John	IN		1			1	0	4000	4000
Pombo, Richard	CA		1			1	0	500	500
Quinn, Jack	NY		1			1	8324	17514	25838
Rogers, Harold	KY		1			1	0	600	600
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	FL		1			1	0	500	500
Royce, Ed	CA		1			1	0	500	500
Saxton, James	NJ		1			1	100	3000	3100
Shuster, Bud	PA		1			1	7000	20000	27000
Smith, Christopher	NJ		1			1	6404	26300	32704
Snowe, Olympia	ME		1			1	0	500	500
Solomon, Gerald	NY		1			1	6000	15455	21455
Spence, Floyd	SC		1			1	0	500	500
Stearns, Clifford	FL		1			1	0	500	500
Talent, James	MO		1			1	0	500	500
Taylor, Charles	NC		1			1	0	500	500
Vucanovich, Barbara	NV		1			1	0	500	500
Walsh, James	NY		1			1	500	3000	3500
Weldon, Curt	PA		1			1	4500	23800	28300
Young, Donald	AK		1			1	13700	22300	36000

TOTAL - R.N			37		37	83578	235169	318747
Abercrombie, Neil	HI		1		1	19750	70250	90000
Ackerman, Gary	NY		1		1	37500	96800	134300
Andrews, Robert	NJ		1		1	29000	50500	79500
Barca, Peter	WI		1		1	137050	107400	244450
Barcia, James	MI		1		1	8780	25495	34275
Barlow, Tom	KY		1		1	22700	84400	107100
Barrett, Thomas	WI		1		1	12500	42000	54500
Bevill, Thomas	AL		1		1	7500	9500	17000
Bilbray, James	NV		1		1	18000	50000	68000
Bishop, Sanford	GA		1		1	4500	39050	43550
Blackwell, Lucien	PA		1		1	23000	32620	55620
Bonior, David	MI		1		1	50400	127400	177800
Borski, Robert	PA		1		1	27500	60896	88396
Boucher, Rick	VA		1		1	10250	25250	35500
Brooks, Jack	TX		1		1	13542	42700	56242
Browder, Glen	AL		1		1	0	500	500
Brown, Corrine	FL		1		1	12500	68900	81400
Brown, Sherrod	OH		1		1	10000	118456	128456
Byrne, Leslie	VA		1		1	20950	109400	130350
Clay, William	MO		1		1	26300	60200	86500
Clayton, Eva	NC		1		1	16500	28850	45350
Clyburn, James	SC		1		1	30500	28450	58950
Collins, Barbara	MI		1		1	12250	36250	48500
Collins, Cardiss	IL		1		1	20500	27500	48000
Condit, Gary	CA		1		1	12675	8620	21295
Conyers, John	MI		1		1	28620	63680	92300
Costello, Jerry	IL		1		1	30000	47550	77550
Coyne, William	PA		1		1	2000	52300	54300
Cramer, Robert	AL		1		1	11000	37950	48950
Danner, Pat	MO		1		1	40500	78570	119070
DeFazio, Peter	OR		1		1	21300	45550	66850
DeLauro, Rosa	CT		1		1	22250	52450	74700
Dellums, Robert	CA		1		1	11300	23000	34300
Derrick, Butler	SC		1		1	7500	2000	9500
Deutsch, Peter	FL		1		1	27850	56550	84400
Dingell, John	MI		1		1	20610	50890	71500
Dixon, Julian	CA		1		1	2500	12000	14500
Edwards, Donald	CA		1		1	4500	2000	6500
Engel, Eliot	NY		1		1	18850	49900	68750
Evans, Lane	IL		1		1	19500	40150	59650
Fields, Cleo	LA		1		1	8000	33000	41000
Filner, Bob	CA		1		1	60500	93250	153750
Fingerhut, Eric	OH		1		1	21750	88150	109900
Foglietta, Thomas	PA		1		1	28500	69870	98370
Furse, Elizabeth	OR		1		1	21000	86450	107450

Gejdenson, Samuel	CT			1	1	30376	85992	116368
Gephardt, Richard	MO			1	1	96000	69750	165750
Gonzalez, Henry	TX			1	1	0	13750	13750
Green, Gene	TX			1	1	23500	101600	125100
Gutierrez, Luis	IL			1	1	11450	55200	66650
Hall, Ralph	TX			1	1	0	2000	2000
Hall, Tony	OH			1	1	14500	38550	53050
Hamburg, Dan	CA			1	1	25700	97550	123250
Harman, Jane	CA			1	1	43132	66300	109432
Hilliard, Earl	AL			1	1	23000	32950	55950
Hinchey, Maurice	NY			1	1	9170	78710	87880
Hochbrueckner, G.	NY			1	1	21750	92500	114250
Holden, Tim	PA			1	1	28000	83260	111260
Johnson, Timothy	SD			1	1	9500	57750	67250
Kanjorski, Paul	PA			1	1	5250	24500	29750
Kaptur, Marcy	OH			1	1	51750	78350	130100
Kennelly, Barbara	CT			1	1	7000	19500	26500
Kildee, Dale	MI			1	1	47500	117051	164551
Klecza, Gerald	WI			1	1	20500	40900	61400
Klein, Herbert	NJ			1	1	26500	76800	103300
Klink, Ron	PA			1	1	53250	60550	113800
LaFalce, John	NY			1	1	3000	21500	24500
Lancaster, HM	NC			1	1	0	14800	14800
Lantos, Thomas	CA			1	1	4700	27200	31900
LaRocco, Larry	ID			1	1	19750	81850	101600
Levin, Sander	MI			1	1	14100	104914	119014
Lewis, John	GA			1	1	19500	58250	77750
Lipinski, William	IL			1	1	16000	57750	73750
Long, Jill	IN			1	1	10000	56000	66000
Maloney, Carolyn	NY			1	1	29950	77000	106950
Manton, Thomas	NY			1	1	28200	43650	71850
Margolies-Mezvinsky	PA			1	1	55000	91202	146202
Martinez, Matthew	CA			1	1	5000	22750	27750
McCloskey, Frank	IN			1	1	23500	94100	117600
McHale, Paul	PA			1	1	25700	31000	56700
McKinney, Cynthia	GA			1	1	23650	51750	75400
McNulty, Michael	NY			1	1	14250	17500	31750
Menendez, Robert	NJ			1	1	12000	58250	70250
Mfume, Kweisi	MD			1	1	6950	11250	18200
Miller, George	CA			1	1	25250	31825	57075
Minge, David	MN			1	1	24450	62550	87000
Mink, Patsy	HI			1	1	13300	30300	43600
Moakley, John	MA			1	1	12700	62800	75500
Mollohan, Alan	WV			1	1	20250	22000	42250
Murphy, Austin	PA			1	1	17127	500	17627
Murtha, John	PA			1	1	32000	28250	60250
Nadler, Jerrold	NY			1	1	11000	85200	96200
Neal, Richard	MA			1	1	11500	28750	40250

Oberstar, James	MN			1		1	16000	57000	73000
Obey, David	WI			1		1	16500	37450	53950
Olver, John	MA			1		1	44000	50200	94200
Orton, William	UT			1		1	2500	35250	37750
Owens, Major	NY			1		1	350	35961	36311
Pallone, Frank	NJ			1		1	16450	96650	113100
Payne, Donald	NJ			1		1	16725	31350	48075
Peterson, Collin	MN			1		1	17800	80550	98350
Peterson, Peter	FL			1		1	9500	30000	39500
Pomeroy, Earl	ND			1		1	13000	65450	78450
Rahall, Nick	WV			1		1	18250	49750	68000
Rangel, Charles	NY			1		1	12500	64500	77000
Reed, John	RI			1		1	37450	33700	71150
Roemer, Timothy	IN			1		1	22000	58150	80150
Rush, Bobby	IL			1		1	11500	19500	31000
Sabo, Martin	MN			1		1	22550	41400	63950
Schenk, Lynn	CA			1		1	33750	82150	115900
Schumer, Charles	NY			1		1	0	5500	5500
Scott, Robert	VA			1		1	1000	32800	33800
Serrano, Jose	NY			1		1	5250	13500	18750
Sharp, Philip	IN			1		1	6400	1000	7400
Sisisky, Norman	VA			1		1	0	15500	15500
Slattery, James	KS			1		1	9750	1900	11650
Slaughter, Louise	NY			1		1	38500	83550	122050
Stark, Fortney	CA			1		1	14500	34900	49400
Stokes, Louis	OH			1		1	4500	30750	35250
Strickland, Ted	OH			1		1	18000	94750	112750
Stupack, Bart	MI			1		1	40000	113300	153300
Swett, Richard	NH			1		1	17300	68300	85600
Tauzin, WJ	LA			1		1	500	1750	2250
Taylor, Gene	MS			1		1	0	500	500
Thompson, Bennie	MS			1		1	115164	49250	164414
Thurman, Karen	FL			1		1	11500	69150	80650
Torricelli, Robert	NJ			1		1	13500	41438	54938
Towns, Edolphus	NY			1		1	7130	18620	25750
Traficant, James	OH			1		1	2100	36950	39050
Tucker, Walter	CA			1		1	33500	34150	67650
Unsoeld, Jolene	WA			1		1	21000	101400	122400
Velazquez, Nydia	NY			1		1	34775	50300	85075
Vento, Bruce	MN			1		1	14550	37000	51550
Visclosky, Peter	IN			1		1	21750	60120	81870
Volkmer, Harold	MO			1		1	19600	49900	69500
Washington, Craig	TX			1		1	2000	73800	75800
Waters, Maxine	CA			1		1	12900	15350	28250
Watt, Melvin	NC			1		1	11500	33500	45000
Waxman, Henry	CA			1		1	0	12500	12500
Williams, Pat	MT			1		1	36500	111650	148150
Wilson, Charles	TX			1		1	25250	91500	116750

Wise, Robert	WV			1		1	8000	28250	36250
Woolsey, Lynn	CA			1		1	48750	64150	112900
Wynn, Albert	MD			1		1	13950	47250	61200
Yates, Sidney	IL			1		1	0	3750	3750
TOTAL - D.N				145		145	2938776	7300040	10238816
Sanders, Bernard	VT	1				1	4000	92700	96700

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