(maximum 30 minutes per presentation)
8:15-9:00 Breakfast at RJ Reynolds Auditorium, Fuqua School
9:00-9:30 Lars Ehlers, University of Montreal: Breaking Ties in School Choice: (Non-) Specialized Schools (with Alexander Westkamp)
9:35-10:05 Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University: An Equivalence Result in School Choice
10:10-10:40 Elena Molis, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis: Random Paths to Stability in Roommate Markets with Indifferences (jointly with J. Alcalde-Unzu and E. Inarra)
11:00-11:30 Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University: A Theory of School Choice Lotteries (with Utku Unver)
11:35-12:05 Joana Pais, ISEG/Technical University of Lisbon: Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice (with Flip Klijn and Marc Vorsatz)
2:00-2:30 Guillaume Haeringer, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Knocking out the Supply and Sorting in Centralized Job Markets (with Vincent Iehle and Nuria Rodriguez-Planas)
2:35-3:05 Peter Coles, Harvard Business School: Job Market for New Economics: A Market Design Perspective (with John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried)
3:25-3:55 David Cantala, El Colegio de Mexico: Markovian Assignment Rules (with Francis Bloch)
4:00-4:30 Federico Echenique, CalTech: Aggregate Matching (with SangMok Lee and Matt Shum)
4:50-5:20 Szilvia Papai, Concordia University: Matching with Minimal Priority Rights
5:25-5:55 Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne: Allocation via Deferred Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (with Lars Ehlers)
Shuttle to the restaurant from the hotel at 7:00pm
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8:15-9:00 Breakfast at RJ Reynolds Auditorium, Fuqua School
9:00-9:30 Ozgur Yilmaz, Koc University: Paired kidney donation and listed exchange
9:35-10:05 Herve Moulin, Rice University: Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints (with Olivier Bochet and Rahmi Ilkilic)
10:30-11:00 Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University: Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets (with Parag Pathak and Alvin E. Roth)
11:05-11:35 Marek Pycia, UCLA: Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
11:40-12:10 Jordi Masso, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles (with Ruth Martinez, Alejandro Neme, and Jorge Oviedo)
2:00-2:30 Clayton Featherstone, Stanford University: Stability and Deferred Acceptance: Strategic Behavior (with Eric Mayfesky)
2:35-3:05 Leeat Yariv, Cal Tech: An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching (with Federico Echenique)
3:10-3:40 Morimitsu Kurino, Max Planck Institute of Economics: The Probabilistic Serial Assignment Mechanism (with Onur Kesten and Utku Unver)
4:10-4:40 Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research: Interviewing in Two-sided Matching Markets (with Robin Lee)
4:45-5:15 Marilda Sotomayor, Universidade de São Paulo: TBA
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8:15-9:00 Breakfast at RJ Reynolds Auditorium, Fuqua School
9:00-9:30 Muriel Niederle, Stanford University: Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences (with Leeat Yariv)
9:35-10:05 Flip Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis, Barcelona: Farsighted House Allocation (with Bettina Klaus and Markus Walzl)
10:10-10:40 Eric Budish, Chicago Business School: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (with Estelle Cantillon)
11:00-11:30 John W. Hatfield, Stanford Business School: Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (with Scott D. Kominers)
11:35-12:05 Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford Business School: Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (with John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor and Alexander Westkamp)