Professor of Economics
Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo is Professor of Economics at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He also has a courtesy appointment at the Economics Department of Duke University. He has a Laurea Magna cum laude from Bocconi University in Milan, Italy, and a Ph.D. in Business Administration from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business of New York University, and visited the Economics department of the University of Michigan for one year. Currently, Professor Lopomo teaches Managerial Economics and Competitive Analysis to MBA students. He has taught courses on similar topics to undergraduate and PhD students. Professor Lopomo's research focuses on applied game theory, auction and mechanism design. His work has been published in leading journals of economics including The Review of Economic Studies, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Rand Journal of Economics and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Ph.D., Stanford University 1994
- B.S., Bocconi University (Italy) 1988
Belloni, A, Lopomo, G, and Wang, S. "Resource Allocation Under Demand Uncertainty and Private Information." Management Science (November 3, 2016). Full Text
Krishna, RV, Lopomo, G, and Taylor, CR. "Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership." RAND Journal of Economics 44, no. 1 (March 2013): 104-127.
Lopomo, G, Marx, LM, McAdams, D, and Murray, B. "Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States." Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, no. 1 (2011): 25-43. Full Text
Belloni, A, Lopomo, G, and Wang, S. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Finite-Dimensional Approximations and Efficient Computation." Operations Research 58, no. 4-part-2 (August 2010): 1079-1089. Full Text Open Access Copy
VARMA, GD, and LOPOMO, G. "NON-COOPERATIVE ENTRY DETERRENCE IN LICENSE AUCTIONS: DYNAMIC VERSUS SEALED BID-super-* ." The Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 2 (June 2010): 450-476.
Anton, JJ, Brusco, S, and Lopomo, G. "Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data." 69, no. 1 (May 2010): 24-41.
Varma, GD, and Lopomo, G. "Non-cooperative entry deterrence in license auctions: Dynamic versus sealed bid." Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 2 (2010): 450-476. Full Text
Krishna, RV, Lopomo, G, and Taylor, CR. Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership. March 2013. Full Text
Economides, N, Lopomo, G, and Woroch, G. Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing. 2005.
Brusco, S, and Lopomo, G. Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints. 2002.
Albert, M, Conitzer, V, and Lopomo, G. "Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility." January 1, 2016.
Albert, M, Conitzer, V, and Lopomo, G. "Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design." June 1, 2015.