Tracy R. Lewis
  • Tracy R. Lewis

  • Professor
  • Economics
  • 305 Soc Sci, Durham, NC 27708
  • Campus Box 90120
  • Fax: +1 (919) 660-7971
  • Curriculum Vitae
  • Bio

    Tracy R. Lewis joined the faculty of Duke University in 2003 as a Martin L. Black professor of business administration within the Fuqua School of Business. Upon his arrival at Duke, he became the Director of the Innovation at the University. Prior to teaching at Duke, he was the James Walter Eminent Scholar in Economics at the University of Florida. He has also been professor of economics at the University of California, Davis and at the University of British Columbia. Throughout his teaching career, Tracy has also held other positions, including Economic Advisor for the National Research Council at the Academy of Sciences in 2002, and Health Care Consultant to the Florida Attorney General’s office in 2000. Before pursuing his career, he earned is Ph.D. in 1975 and his B.A. in 1970 from the University of California, San Diego.

    Tracy’s teaching and research interests revolve around industrial organization and contracting theory. He is perhaps best known for is work with James A. Brander, which was published in the American Economic Review in 1986. This work, entitled “Oligopoly and Financial Structure,” introduces the Brander-Lewis model of oligopolistic competition. Tracy’s work has been published in the form of books and journal articles, including his book entitled, Optimal Resources Management Under Conditions of Uncertainty: The Case of an Ocean Fishery. His writings have appeared in such academic journals as the International Economic Review, the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, and many more.

    For his research contributions, Tracy has received several awards, fellowships, and grants. He was acknowledged as University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of the year for 1999-2000 and received the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Research Fellowship for 1981-86. His was awarded National Science Foundation grants for 1988-91 and 1992-94, and a Veteran’s Administration Research Grant in 1995-96.

    In addition to his teaching and research, Tracy has held numerous professional positions. Within academia, he was on the organization committee for the 1998 summer Econometric Society meetings. He is now co-editor for the Journal of Law Economics and Organization and serves on the board of editors for the The B.E. Journals in Industrial Organization and the Review of Network Economics. He is currently a member of the board of advisors for the Program on Workable Energy Regulation at the University of California and the Scientific Committee for the CIRANO Research Foundation at the University of Montreal.
  • Specialties

    • Microeconomic Theory
    • Industrial Organization
  • Research Description

    Professor Lewis specializes in the study of industrial organization and contracting theory. He has received funding from a number of grants throughout his career, including those awarded by the National Science Foundation, the Center for the Study of the Service Economy, the Canada Council, the Veteran’s Administration, and others. He has been publishing his research findings and ideas in a number of books and academic journals since 1976. Some of his earliest published papers include the titles, “Monopoly Exploitation of an Exhaustible Resource,” “The Exhaustion and Depletion of Natural Resources,” and “Energy vs. the Environment.” His more recent projects include, “Managing Dynamic Competition” and “Regulating an Innovating Monopolist,” both written in collaboration with Duke colleague Huseyin Yildrim, and also “Bargaining when Exchange Affects the Value of Future Trade” with Charles Hadlock. His most widely known work is perhaps the “Brander-Lewis model of oligopolistic competition,” which he co-authored with James A. Brander and published in 1986. Along with his independent research, Professor Lewis has also been an Economic Advisor for the National Research Council at the Academy of Sciences and a research associate for the CIRANO Research Foundation at the University of Montreal.
  • Education

      • Ph.D.,
      • University of California at San Diego,
      • 1975
      • B.A.,
      • University of California at San Diego,
      • 1970
  • Recent Publications

      • H Grabowski, T Lewis, R Guha, Z Ivanova, M Salgado and S Woodhouse.
      • (2012).
      • Does generic entry always increase consumer welfare?.
      • Food and Drug Law Journal
      • ,
      • 67
      • (3)
      • ,
      • 373-391.
      Publication Description

      This article examines how the nature of competition between brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry and provides a framework for analyzing the effect of generic entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in competition along dimensions other than retail price - such as competition in research and development efforts and in promotional activities - may, in certain situations, result in generic entry having an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.

      • TR Lewis.
      • (2012).
      • A theory of delegated search for the best alternative.
      • RAND Journal of Economics
      • ,
      • 43
      • (3)
      • ,
      • 391-416.
      • [web]
      Publication Description

      Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principal's ability to delegate depends on the agent's luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option-to-buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay-for-performance arrangement. © 2012, RAND.

      • J Anton, G Biglaiser and T Lewis.
      • (2011).
      • Inventory in vertical relationships with private information and interdependent values.
      • International Journal of Economic Theory
      • ,
      • 7
      • (1)
      • ,
      • 51-63.
      • [web]
      Publication Description

      We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a manufacturer. We find that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its private information. We characterize the final allocation of the good and show that the distributor may have too few (many) units relative to the efficient allocation when demand is high (low). © IAET.

      • YK Che, J Kim and TR Lewis.
      • (2010).
      • Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?.
      • Economics Letters
      • ,
      • 108
      • (1)
      • ,
      • 52-54.
      • [web]
      Publication Description

      We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target firms to recruit white knights in response to a hostile takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of the target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize entry of a subsequent bidder overdisciplines the initial bidder's preemption and results in excessive entry by a second bidder. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

      • TR Lewis, JH Reichman and AD So.
      • (2007).
      • The case for public funding and public oversight of clinical trials.
      • Economists' Voice
      • ,
      • 4
      • (1)
      • ,
      • 1-4.
  • View All Publications
  • Teaching

    • ECON 885.05
      • Social Sciences 109
      • Th 03:05 PM-05:35 PM
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