• Marc F Bellemare

  • Assistant Professor
  • 221 Sanford Institute of Public Policy
  • Campus Box 90312
  • Phone: (919) 613-7405
  • Fax: 919-681-8288
  • Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 4:30-6:00
  • Homepage
  • Curriculum Vitae
  • Overview

    There are three main axes to my research, all pertaining to developing countries. The first has to do with the use of contracts in developing countries. More specifically, I am interested in testing the implications of contract theory using microeconomic data. As such, I have worked and am working on sharecropping contracts and on the use of monitoring as a means to reduce information asymmetries in contract farming in Madagascar. The second has to do with the market participation of households. Agricultural households are both consumption and production units. They can thus be net buyers of given commodities, autarkic with respect to them, or net sellers of them. More specifically, I am interested in what determines the nature and extent of household market participation. As such, I have worked on livestock markets in Eastern Africa and am working on The third has to do with price risk aversion and the welfare effects of price fluctuations on agricultural households and firms in developing countries. Economic theory states that certain agents will be price risk-averse while others will remain price risk-neutral, and others still will be price risk-loving. As such, I am working on a whole new research agenda pertaining to price risk aversion along with co-authors Chris Barrett and David Just.
  • Specialties

    • Development Economics
    • Econometrics
  • Current Projects

    Reverse Share Tenancy, Monitoring in Production Contracts, Household Market Participation, Price Risk Aversion
  • Areas of Interest

    Development Economics
    Agricultural Economics
    Applied Econometrics
    Contract Theory
    Applied Micro
  • Education

      • Ph.D. (Applied Economics),
      • Applied Economics,
      • Cornell University,
      • 2006
      • M.Sc. (Economics),
      • Departement de sciences economiques,
      • Universite de Montreal,
      • 2001
      • B.Sc.,
      • Major in Economics, Minor in Philosophy,
      • Universite de Montreal,
      • 1999
  • Awards, Honors and Distinctions

      • Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award,
      • American Agricultural Economics Association,
      • July, 2007
  • Selected Publications

      • M.F. Bellemare.
      • (2009).
      • Sharecropping, Insecure Land Rights, and Land Titling Policies: A Case Study of Lac Alaotra, Madagascar.
      • Development Policy Review
      • ,
      • 29
      • (1)
      • ,
      • 87-106.
      • M.F. Bellemare and C.B. Barrett.
      • (2006).
      • An Ordered Tobit Model of Market Participation: Evidence from Kenya and Ethiopia.
      • American Journal of Agricultural Economics
      • ,
      • 88
      • (2)
      • ,
      • 324-337.
      • Barrett, Christopher B., Marc F. Bellemare, and Sharon M. Osterloh.
      • (2006).
      • Household-Level Livestock Marketing Behavior Among Northern Kenyan and Southern Ethiopian Pastoralists.
      • In John McPeak and Peter D. Little (Eds.),
      • Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges
      • ,
      • (pp. 15-38).
      • Warwickshire, UK: ITDG Publishing.
      • M.F. Bellemare, C.B. Barrett, and D.R. Just.
      • (December, 2010).
      • The Welfare Impacts of Commodity Price Fluctuations: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia.
      • .
      • [web]
      Publication Description

      We study household attitude with respect to price risk. Whereas price risk aversion has so far been studied empirically only for single staple commodities, we expand the analytical framework so as to derive an estimable matrix of own- and cross-price risk aversion coefficients. This imposes strong restrictions on the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients, which has a complex relation to the household’s Slutsky substitution matrix. Using a panel of rural Ethiopian households, we test whether the restrictions implied by the theory hold empirically, as well as whether distinct patterns of price risk aversion emerge. We ultimately find strong empirical support for the theory and widespread support for the hypothesis that households are on average risk-averse over own- and cross-price fluctuations.

      • M.F. Bellemare.
      • (2008).
      • The (Im)possibility of Reverse Share Tenancy.
      • .
      • [web]
      Publication Description

      Under the usual assumption that the landlord is risk-neutral and the tenant is risk-averse, sharecropping is second-best in that it trades off risk sharing and incentives and leads to a constrained Pareto-efficient agreement. Many, however, have reported instances of reverse share tenancy, i.e., sharecropping in which the landlord is considerably poorer than the tenant. This paper shows that reverse share tenancy is impossible under the canonical model of sharecropping but becomes possible if and only if (i) both the landlord and the tenant can be assumed risk-averse; or (ii) there exist significant transactions costs making sharecropping more desirable than either a wage or fixed rent contract.

  • View All Publications
  • PhD Students

    • Eva Csaky
      • 2011 - present
    • Zachary S. Brown
      • January 01, 2010 - present
    • Shouyue Yu
      • January 01, 2008 - present
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