This article examines how the nature of competition between brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry and provides a framework for analyzing the effect of generic entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in competition along dimensions other than retail price - such as competition in research and development efforts and in promotional activities - may, in certain situations, result in generic entry having an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.
Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principal's ability to delegate depends on the agent's luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option-to-buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay-for-performance arrangement. Â© 2012, RAND.
We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a manufacturer. We find that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its private information. We characterize the final allocation of the good and show that the distributor may have too few (many) units relative to the efficient allocation when demand is high (low). Â© IAET.
We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target firms to recruit white knights in response to a hostile takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of the target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize entry of a subsequent bidder overdisciplines the initial bidder's preemption and results in excessive entry by a second bidder. Â© 2010 Elsevier B.V.