Professor of Economics
Professor Ambrus’ research focuses on a broad range of subjects including game theory, experimental economics, microeconomic theory, industrial organization, political economics, development economics and economic history. He has received various grants from the National Science Foundation. His most recent work has been published in the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, and Theoretical Economics.
- Ph.D., Princeton University 2003
Ambrus, A, Chaney, EJ, and Salitskiy, I. "Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Asymmetric Information." Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, no. 115 (November 6, 2014).
Ambrus, A, and Lu, SE. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders." Games and Economic Behavior 88 (November 2014): 174-189. Full Text
Ambrus, A, Mobius, M, and Szeidl, A. "Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks." American Economic Review 104, no. 1 (January 2014).
Ambrus, A, Azevedo, EM, Kamada, Y, and Takagi, Y. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 94 (2013): 103-115. Full Text
Ambrus, A, and Greiner, B. "Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study." AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 102, no. 7 (December 2012): 3317-3332. Full Text
Ambrus, A, Sándor, L, and You, HY. "Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix." Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, no. 122 (October 9, 2012). Open Access Copy
Ambrus, A, and Pathak, P. "Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments." Journal of Public Economics 95, no. 1-2 (2011): 500-512. (Academic Article)
Ambrus, A, Azevedo, E, and Kamada, Y. "Hierarchical cheap talk." Accepted by Theoretical Economics (2011). (Academic Article)