Daniel A. Graham
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Daniel A. Graham conducts research exploring the general subjects of game theory, the economics of information, and microeconomic theory. His microeconomic investigations focus specifically on uncertainty, including cost/benefit analysis, insurance, and incentives. His most recent research projects involve the general multi-object auction, pure trade with private information, and information and queues. For his work, he has received funding from various grants including those awarded by the National Science Foundation for his projects, “Collusive Behavior at Auctions” and “Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non-Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior”, completed in collaboration with Robert Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard. Some titles of his published papers, completed throughout his career, include, “Liftlining” with Robert C. Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard; “Public Expenditure Under Uncertainty: The Net-Benefit Criteria;” “A Note on Decentralized Utility Regulation” with John M. Vernon; “Contingent Damages: A New Approach to Products Liability” with Ellen R. Peirce; “Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Uncertainty,” and more. Along with his independent projects, Professor Graham has also served as a visiting research fellow for the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Ph.D., Duke University 1969
- B.S., West Texas A&M University 1967
Marshall, DA Graham with Robert C., and Jean-Francois Richard. “Liftlining".” Advances in Applied Microeconomics 6 (1996): 15–40.
GRAHAM, D. A. “PUBLIC-EXPENDITURE UNDER UNCERTAINTY - THE NET-BENEFIT CRITERIA.” American Economic Review 82, no. 4 (September 1, 1992): 822–46. Open Access Copy
Vernon, DA Graham with John M. “"A Note on Decentralized Utility Regulation".” Southern Economic Journal, July 1991, 273–75.
GRAHAM, D. A., R. C. MARSHALL, and J. F. RICHARD. “DIFFERENTIAL PAYMENTS WITHIN A BIDDER COALITION AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE.” American Economic Review 80, no. 3 (June 1, 1990): 493–510. Open Access Copy
Graham, D. A., R. C. Marshall, and J. F. Richard. “Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders.” Economics Letters 32, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 13–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z. Full Text
Graham, Daniel A., and Ellen R. Peirce. “Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-up Game.” Law and Contemporary Problems 52, no. 1 (1989): 9–9. https://doi.org/10.2307/1191894. Full Text Open Access Copy
Graham, Daniel A., and Robert C. Marshall. “Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 6 (December 1987): 1217–39. https://doi.org/10.1086/261512. Full Text Open Access Copy
Graham, D. A., and Ellen R. Peirce. “Contingent Damages: A New Approach to Products Liability.” Journal of Legal Studies 13 (August 1984): 441–68.
Graham, D. A. “Estimating the ' state dependent' utility function.” Natural Resources Journal 23, no. 3 (January 1, 1983): 649–56.
Graham, D. A. “Cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty.” American Economic Review 71, no. 4 (January 1, 1981): 715–25.
Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non-Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior awarded by National Science Foundation (Co-Principal Investigator). 1987 to 1990
Collusive Behavior at Auctions awarded by National Science Foundation (Co-Principal Investigator). 1985 to 1988