Giuseppe Lopomo

Giuseppe Lopomo

Professor of Economics

External Address: 
A406 Fuq Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120
Phone: 
(919) 660-7820

Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo is Professor of Economics at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He also has a courtesy appointment at the Economics Department of Duke University.

He has a Laurea Magna cum laude from Bocconi University in Milan, Italy, and a Ph.D. in Business Administration from the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business of New York University, and visited the Economics department of the University of Michigan for one year.

Currently, Professor Lopomo teaches Managerial Economics and Competitive Analysis to MBA students. He has taught courses on similar topics to undergraduate and PhD students.

Professor Lopomo's research focuses on applied game theory, auction and mechanism design. His work has been published in leading journals of economics including The Review of Economic Studies, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Rand Journal of Economics and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Education

  • Ph.D., Stanford University 1994
  • B.S., Bocconi University (Italy) 1988

Belloni, A., G. Lopomo, and S. Wang. “Resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information.” Management Science 63, no. 12 (December 1, 2017): 4219–35. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2574. Full Text

Krishna, R Vijay, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Curtis R. Taylor. “Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership.” Rand Journal of Economics 44, no. 1 (March 2013): 104–27.

Lopomo, G., L. M. Marx, and P. Sun. “Bidder collusion at first-price auctions.” Review of Economic Design 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 177–211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9. Full Text

Lopomo, G., L. M. Marx, D. McAdams, and B. Murray. “Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 25–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/req024. Full Text

Lopomo, G., L. Rigotti, and C. Shannon. “Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard.” Journal of Economic Theory 146, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 1148–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018. Full Text

Brusco, S., G. Lopomo, and L. M. Marx. “The economics of contingent re-auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 165–93. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.2.165. Full Text

Belloni, A., G. Lopomo, and S. Wang. “Multidimensional mechanism design: Finite-dimensional approximations and efficient computation.” Operations Research 58, no. 4 PART 2 (July 1, 2010): 1079–89. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0824. Full Text Open Access Copy

Varma, G. D., and G. Lopomo. “Non-cooperative entry deterrence in license auctions: Dynamic versus sealed bid.” Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 450–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00415.x. Full Text

VARMA, G. O. P. A. L. D. A. S., and G. I. U. S. E. P. P. E. LOPOMO. “NON-COOPERATIVE ENTRY DETERRENCE IN LICENSE AUCTIONS: DYNAMIC VERSUS SEALED BID-super-* .” The Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 2 (June 2010): 450–76.

Anton, J. J., S. Brusco, and G. Lopomo. “Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data.” Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 1 (May 1, 2010): 24–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.001. Full Text

Pages

Brusco, Sandro, Giuseppe Lopomo, and S. Viswanathan. “Merger Mechanisms,” 2004.

Brusco, Sandro, and Giuseppe Lopomo. “Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints,” August 2002.

Economides, Nicholas, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Glenn A. Woroch. “Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity Interconnection Pricing,” 1998.

Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility.” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 376–82, 2016.

Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:763–69, 2015.

Selected Grants

Applied Mechanism Design awarded by National Science Foundation (Co-Principal Investigator). 2009 to 2011