Leslie M. Marx

Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Business Administration

External Address: 
A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
(919) 660-7762

Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.


  • Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
  • M.A., Northwestern University 1991
  • B.S., Duke University 1989

Marshall, RC, Marx, LM, and Meurer, MJ. "The economics of bidder collusion." In International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, 367-397. January 1, 2014. Full Text

Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "Club good intermediaries." International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (January 2017): 430-459. Full Text

Lopomo, G, Marshall, RC, and Marx, LM. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions." The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 5, no. 1 (June 2005): 1-28.

Applied Mechanism Design awarded by National Science Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2009 to 2011