Leslie M. Marx

Leslie M. Marx

Professor of Economics

External Address: 
A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
Phone: 
(919) 660-7762

Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.

Education

  • Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
  • M.A., Northwestern University 1991
  • B.S., Duke University 1989

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Merger review with intermediate buyer power.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 67 (December 1, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102531. Full Text

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Mix-and-match divestitures and merger harm.” Japanese Economic Review 70, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 346–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12237. Full Text

Delacrétaz, D., S. Loertscher, L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade.” Journal of Economic Theory 179 (January 1, 2019): 416–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004. Full Text

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Merger review for markets with buyer power.” Journal of Political Economy, January 1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1086/702173. Full Text

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Auctions with bid credits and resale.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 55 (November 1, 2017): 58–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002. Full Text

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Club good intermediaries.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (January 1, 2017): 430–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007. Full Text

Loertscher, S., L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “A long way coming: Designing centralized markets with privately informed buyers and sellers.” Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 857–97. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.4.857. Full Text

Marx, L. M., C. Mezzetti, and R. C. Marshall. “Antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 205–40. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140054. Full Text

Kumar, V., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and L. Samkharadze. “Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 39 (January 1, 2015): 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.002. Full Text

Pages

Marshall, Robert C., and Leslie M. Marx. The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings. Vol. 1, 2012.

Marx, L. M., and C. Mazzetti. “Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities.” In Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion. Hart Publishing, 2015.

Marx, L. M., R. Green, and R. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. Blair and D. Sokol. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015.

Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and C. Mezzetti. “What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught.” In Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation. East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, 2015.

Marx, L. M., E. Green, and R. C. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. D. Blair and D. D. Sokol, 464–97. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.

Marx, L. M., and R. C. Marshall. “Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective.” In William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum An Antitrust Tribute, edited by N. Charbit and E. Ramundo, Vol. 2. Exhibit A, 2014.

Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and M. Meurer. “The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion.” In Game Theory and Business Applications, 2nd Edition, edited by K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson. Springer, 2014.

Marshall, R. C., L. M. Marx, and M. J. Meurer. “The economics of bidder collusion.” In International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, 194:367–97, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_14. Full Text

Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses.” In Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, 9781107034129:552–78, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139524421.023. Full Text

Marx, L. M., W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, and M. Raiff. “Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements.” In Handbook of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Marx, L. M., E. Kovacic, R. C. Marshall, and S. P. Schulenberg. “Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion.” In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute:  International Antitrust Law & Policy, 2007, edited by B. E. Hawk, n.d.

Selected Grants

Applied Mechanism Design awarded by National Science Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2009 to 2011