Leslie M. Marx
Professor of Economics
Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.
- Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
- M.A., Northwestern University 1991
- B.S., Duke University 1989
Marx, LM. "Defending against potential collusion by your suppliers—26th Colin Clark Memorial Lecture." Economic Analysis and Policy 53 (March 2017): 123-128. Full Text
Loertscher, S, Marx, LM, and Wilkening, T. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers." Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 2015): 857-897. Full Text
Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses." Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (November 2014): 245-273. Full Text
Marx, LM, and Mezzetti, C. "Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms." Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2, no. 2 (October 1, 2014): 305-332. Full Text
Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses." Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 245-273. Full Text
Heeb, R, Kovacic, WE, Marshall, RC, and Marx, LM. "Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct." Chicago Journal of International Law 10 (November 9, 2011): 213-213.
Marx, LM, and Mazzetti, C. "Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities (Accepted)." In Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion. Hart Publishing, 2015.
Marx, LM, Green, R, and Marshall, R. "Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly (Accepted)." In Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics,edited by R Blair and D Sokol. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015.
Marx, LM, Marshall, R, and Mezzetti, C. "What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught (Accepted)." In Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation. East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, 2015.
Marx, LM, Green, E, and Marshall, RC. "Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly." In The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics,edited by RD Blair and DD Sokol, 464-497. Oxford University Press, USA, November 19, 2014. (Chapter)
Marx, LM, and Marshall, RC. "Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective." In William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum An Antitrust Tribute,edited by N Charbit and E Ramundo. Exhibit A, September 9, 2014. (Chapter)
Marx, LM, Marshall, R, and Meurer, M. "The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion." In Game Theory and Business Applications, 2nd Edition,edited by K Chatterjee and W Samuelson. Springer, 2014.
Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses." In Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, 552-578. January 1, 2011. Full Text
Marx, LM, Kovacic, W, Marshall, R, and Raiff, M. "Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements." In Handbook of Procurement,edited by N Dimitri, G Piga, and G Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Marx, LM, Kovacic, E, Marshall, RC, and Schulenberg, SP. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion." In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, 2007,edited by BE Hawk.. (Chapter)