Leslie M. Marx
Professor of Economics
Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.
- Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
- M.A., Northwestern University 1991
- B.S., Duke University 1989
Delacrétaz, D., S. Loertscher, L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade.” Journal of Economic Theory 179 (January 1, 2019): 416–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004. Full Text
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Auctions with bid credits and resale.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 55 (November 1, 2017): 58–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002. Full Text
Marx, L. M. “Defending against potential collusion by your suppliers—26th Colin Clark Memorial Lecture.” Economic Analysis and Policy 53 (March 1, 2017): 123–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2017.01.002. Full Text
Loertscher, S., L. M. Marx, and T. Wilkening. “A long way coming: Designing centralized markets with privately informed buyers and sellers.” Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 857–97. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.4.857. Full Text
Kumar, V., R. C. Marshall, L. M. Marx, and L. Samkharadze. “Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 39 (January 1, 2015): 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.002. Full Text
Marx, L. M., C. Mezzetti, and R. C. Marshall. “Antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 205–40. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140054. Full Text
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses.” Review of Industrial Organization, July 19, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9427-y. Full Text
Marx, L. M., and C. Mezzetti. “Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms.” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 305–32. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008. Full Text
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses.” Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 245–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9427-y. Full Text
Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and C. Mezzetti. “What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught.” In Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation. East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, 2015.
Marx, L. M., and C. Mazzetti. “Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities.” In Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion. Hart Publishing, 2015.
Marx, L. M., R. Green, and R. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. Blair and D. Sokol. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015.
Marx, L. M., E. Green, and R. C. Marshall. “Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, edited by R. D. Blair and D. D. Sokol, 464–97. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.
Marx, L. M., and R. C. Marshall. “Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective.” In William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum An Antitrust Tribute, edited by N. Charbit and E. Ramundo, Vol. 2. Exhibit A, 2014.
Marshall, R. C., L. M. Marx, and M. J. Meurer. “The economics of bidder collusion.” In International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, 194:367–97, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_14. Full Text
Marx, L. M., R. Marshall, and M. Meurer. “The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion.” In Game Theory and Business Applications, 2nd Edition, edited by K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson. Springer, 2014.
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx. “Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses.” In Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, 9781107034129:552–78, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139524421.023. Full Text
Marx, L. M., W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, and M. Raiff. “Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements.” In Handbook of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Marx, L. M., E. Kovacic, R. C. Marshall, and S. P. Schulenberg. “Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion.” In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, 2007, edited by B. E. Hawk, n.d.