Leslie M. Marx

Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Business Administration

External Address: 
A411 Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC 27708-0120
(919) 660-7762

Leslie M. Marx, PhD, Robert A. Bandeen Professor of Economics; BS (Duke University), MA (Northwestern University), PhD (Northwestern University) Professor Marx has research interests in game theory and industrial organization. Professor Marx’s research focuses on the problem of anti-competitive behavior by individuals and firms, including collusion, bid rigging, and anti-competitive contract provisions. This research improves our ability to detect collusion, teaches us how auctions and other markets can be made less susceptible to collusion, and guides antitrust authorities in understanding what behavior should be viewed as anti-competitive. Professor Marx’s research has appeared in such publications as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. She authored the 2012 book The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, published by MIT Press. She is currently on the editorial boards for International Journal of Game Theory and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. She is the recipient of two National Science Foundation research grants, a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. Professor Marx was a member of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Fencing Team.


  • Ph.D., Northwestern University 1994
  • M.A., Northwestern University 1991
  • B.S., Duke University 1989

Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "Club good intermediaries." International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (January 2017): 430-459. Full Text

Loertscher, S, Marx, LM, and Wilkening, T. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers." Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 4 (December 2015): 857-897. Full Text

Marx, LM, Mezzetti, C, and Marshall, RC. "Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (August 2015): 205-240. Full Text

Kumar, V, Marshall, RC, Marx, LM, and Samkharadze, L. "Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger." International Journal of Industrial Organization 39 (March 2015): 71-80. Full Text

Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses." Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (November 2014): 245-273. Full Text

Marx, LM, and Mezzetti, C. "Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms." Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2, no. 2 (October 1, 2014): 305-332. Full Text

Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses." Review of Industrial Organization 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 245-273. Full Text

Heeb, R, Kovacic, WE, Marshall, RC, and Marx, LM. "Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct." Chicago Journal of International Law 10 (November 9, 2011): 213-213.

Lopomo, G, Marx, LM, and Sun, P. "Bidder collusion at first-price auctions." Review of Economic Design 15, no. 3 (2011): 177-211. Full Text


Marshall, RC, and Marx, LM. The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings. May 2012.

Marx, LM, and Mazzetti, C. "Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities (Accepted)." In Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion. Hart Publishing, 2015.

Marx, LM, Green, R, and Marshall, R. "Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly (Accepted)." In Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics,edited by R Blair and D Sokol. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015.

Marx, LM, Marshall, R, and Mezzetti, C. "What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught (Accepted)." In Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation. East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, 2015.

Marx, LM, Green, E, and Marshall, RC. "Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly." In The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics,edited by RD Blair and DD Sokol, 464-497. Oxford University Press, USA, November 19, 2014. (Chapter)

Marx, LM, and Marshall, RC. "Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective." In William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum An Antitrust Tribute,edited by N Charbit and E Ramundo. Exhibit A, September 9, 2014. (Chapter)

Marshall, RC, Marx, LM, and Meurer, MJ. "The economics of bidder collusion." In International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, 367-397. January 1, 2014. Full Text

Marx, LM, Marshall, R, and Meurer, M. "The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion." In Game Theory and Business Applications, 2nd Edition,edited by K Chatterjee and W Samuelson. Springer, 2014.

Loertscher, S, and Marx, LM. "Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses." In Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation, 552-578. January 1, 2011. Full Text

Marx, LM, Kovacic, W, Marshall, R, and Raiff, M. "Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements." In Handbook of Procurement,edited by N Dimitri, G Piga, and G Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Marx, LM, Kovacic, E, Marshall, RC, and Schulenberg, SP. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion." In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, 2007,edited by BE Hawk.. (Chapter)

Applied Mechanism Design awarded by National Science Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2009 to 2011