Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

Conitzer, V. “An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer science and economics.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (November 7, 2012): 2357–62.

Conitzer, V. “Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to security.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (November 7, 2012): 2106–12.

Letchford, J., L. MacDermed, V. Conitzer, R. Parr, and C. L. Isbell. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic games.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 7, 2012): 1380–86.

Waggoner, B., L. Xia, and V. Conitzer. “Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 7, 2012): 1485–91.

Conitzer, V. “Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?Mathematical Social Sciences 64, no. 1 (July 1, 2012): 100–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.006. Full Text

Conitzer, V., C. R. Taylor, and L. Wagman. “Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with repeat purchases.” Marketing Science 31, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 277–92. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1110.0691. Full Text

Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition.” International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 91–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0275-9. Full Text

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities.” Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009. Full Text

Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal.” Corr abs/1208.6501 (2012).

Guo, M., V. Naroditskiy, V. Conitzer, A. Greenwald, and N. R. Jennings. “Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: Public goods and beyond.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 7090 LNCS (December 12, 2011): 158–69. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-14. Full Text

Pages

Jakobsen, Sune K., Troels Bjerre Sørensen, and Vincent Conitzer. “Timeability of Extensive-Form Games.” In Itcs, edited by Madhu Sudan, 191–99. ACM, 2016.

Brill, M., R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. “Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners).” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.

Moon, Catherine, and Vincent Conitzer. “Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract).” In Aamas, edited by Catholijn M. Jonker, Stacy Marsella, John Thangarajah, and Karl Tuyls, 1413–14. ACM, 2016.

Conitzer, V., R. Freeman, M. Brill, and Y. Li. “Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.

Brill, M., V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. “False-name-proof recommendations in social networks.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2016, 2016.

Brill, M., and V. Conitzer. “Strategic voting and strategic candidacy.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:819–26, 2015.

Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:763–69, 2015.

Li, Y., and V. Conitzer. “Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability under noise.” In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2:979–85, 2015.

Freeman, R., M. Brill, and V. Conitzer. “General tiebreaking schemes for computational social choice.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 3:1401–9, 2015.

Kephart, A., and V. Conitzer. “Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:357–65, 2015.

Pages