Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

De Weerdt, M. M., P. Harrenstein, and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties.” Games and Economic Behavior 86 (January 1, 2014): 405–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001. Full Text

Conitzer, V., D. Easley, and M. Babaioff. “EC'14 foreword.” Ec 2014  Proceedings of the 15th Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, January 1, 2014.

Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.” International Journal of Game Theory 43, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 599–618. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3. Full Text

Letchford, J., D. Korzhyk, and V. Conitzer. “On the value of commitment.” Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems 28, no. 6 (January 1, 2014): 986–1016. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9. Full Text

Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions.” Artificial Intelligence 216 (January 1, 2014): 287–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006. Full Text

Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.” International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, 1–20.

Xia, Lirong, and Vincent Conitzer. “Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders.Corr abs/1401.3876 (2014).

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design.Corr abs/1408.1486 (2014).

Conitzer, Vincent. “Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries.Corr abs/1401.3449 (2014).

Korzhyk, Dmytro, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe. “Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness.Corr abs/1401.3888 (2014).

Pages

Freeman, R., S. M. Zahedi, and V. Conitzer. “Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 0:4580–87, 2017. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/639. Full Text

Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In Aaai Workshop  Technical Report, WS-17-01-WS-17-15:105–9, 2017.

Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and P. Stone. “Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can we learn optimal mechanisms?” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:69–77, 2017.

Bergemann, D., Y. Chen, and V. Conitzer. “EC 2016 foreword.” In Ec 2016  Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, iii–iv, 2016.

Kephart, A., and V. Conitzer. “The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs.” In Ec 2016  Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation, 85–102, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940795. Full Text

Moon, C., and V. Conitzer. “Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016-January:416–23, 2016.

Andersen, G., and V. Conitzer. “ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice simultaneously.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016-January:3662–69, 2016.

Conitzer, V. “Computing equilibria with partial commitment.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 10123 LNCS:1–14, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1. Full Text

Albert, M., V. Conitzer, and G. Lopomo. “Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility.” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 376–82, 2016.

Brill, M., R. Freeman, and V. Conitzer. “Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan setwinners).” In 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016, 418–24, 2016.

Pages