Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

Conitzer, V., J. Derryberry, and T. Sandholm. “Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, December 9, 2004, 212–18.

Santi, P., V. Conitzer, and T. Sandholm. “Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions.” Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science) 3120 (December 9, 2004): 1–16.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.” Proceedings, Twenty First International Conference on Machine Learning, Icml 2004, December 1, 2004, 185–92.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments.” Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2004 1 (September 27, 2004): 128–35.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (August 4, 2004): 266–67.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (August 4, 2004): 132–41.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (August 4, 2004): 51–60.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (August 4, 2004): 262–63.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (December 1, 2003): 17–24.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.” Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning 1 (December 1, 2003): 83–90.

Pages