Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

Conitzer, Vincent. “AI and Economic Theory.” Ieee Intelligent Systems 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 7–7.

Conitzer, V., and M. Yokoo. “Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations.” Ai Magazine 31, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 65–77.

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 6484 LNCS (December 1, 2010): 402–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_33. Full Text

Conitzer, V., N. Immorlica, J. Letchford, K. Munagala, and L. Wagman. “False-name-proofness in social networks.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 6484 LNCS (December 1, 2010): 209–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_17. Full Text

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Compilation complexity of common voting rules.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 1, 2010): 915–20.

Korzhyk, D., V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. “Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 1, 2010): 805–10.

Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3 (November 1, 2010): 1676–79.

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2 (November 1, 2010): 921–26.

Letchford, J., and V. Conitzer. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 23, 2010, 83–92. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807354. Full Text

Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and A. D. Procaccia. “A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 23, 2010, 275–84. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807386. Full Text

Pages

Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. “Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:399–406, 2010.

Iwasaki, A., V. Conitzer, Y. Omori, Y. Sakurai, T. Todo, M. Guo, and M. Yokoo. “Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.” In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, 1:633–40, 2010.

Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. “10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice..” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.

Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. “10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice..” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.

Brandt, Felix, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, and William S. Zwicker, eds. “Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010.” In Computational Foundations of Social Choice, Vol. 10101. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany, 2010.

Guo, Mingyu, and Vincent Conitzer. “False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal..” In Aamas, edited by Wiebe van der Hoek, Gal A. Kaminka, Yves Lespérance, Michael Luck, and Sandip Sen, 1475–76. IFAAMAS, 2010.

Bhattacharya, Sayan, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, and Lirong Xia. “Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions..” In Soda, edited by Moses Charikar, 554–72. SIAM, 2010.

Farfel, J., and V. Conitzer. “A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market.” In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 14 LNICST:61–73, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_10. Full Text

Conitzer, Vincent. “Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory..” In Uai, edited by Jeff A. Bilmes and Andrew Y. Ng, 101–8. AUAI Press, 2009.

Farfel, Joseph, and Vincent Conitzer. “A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market..” In Aamas (2), edited by Carles Sierra, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Keith S. Decker, and Jaime Simão Sichman, 1407–8. IFAAMAS, 2009.

Pages