Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

Guo, M., and V. Conitzer. “Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 210–19. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386825. Full Text

Conitzer, V. “Anonymity-proof voting rules.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 295–306. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_36. Full Text

Apt, K., V. Conitzer, M. Guo, and E. Markakis. “Welfare undominated groves mechanisms.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 426–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48. Full Text

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 99–108. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386810. Full Text

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 109–18. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386811. Full Text

Conitzer, V. “Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.” 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2008, December 1, 2008.

Conitzer, V. “Metareasoning as a formal computational problem.” Aaai Workshop  Technical Report WS-08-07 (December 1, 2008): 29–33.

Letchford, J., V. Conitzer, and K. Jain. “An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 696–707. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_75. Full Text

Conitzer, Vincent. “Editor's puzzle.” Acm Sigecom Exchanges 7, no. 3 (November 1, 2008): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1145/1486877.1486889. Full Text

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “New complexity results about Nash equilibria.” Games and Economic Behavior 63, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 621–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015. Full Text

Pages

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.” In Icml, edited by Tom Fawcett and Nina Mishra, 91–98. AAAI Press, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.” In Ijcai, edited by Georg Gottlob and Toby Walsh, 1099–1106. Morgan Kaufmann, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.” In Ijcai, edited by Georg Gottlob and Toby Walsh, 781–88. Morgan Kaufmann, 2003.

Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.” In Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 613–18, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 392–97. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 314–19. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design.” In Uai, edited by Adnan Darwiche and Nir Friedman, 103–10. Morgan Kaufmann, 2002.

Pages