Vincent Conitzer

Vincent Conitzer

Professor in the Department of Economics

External Address: 
LSRC D207, Durham, NC 27708
Internal Office Address: 
Box 90129, Durham, NC 27708-0129
Phone: 
(919) 660-6503

Education

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University 2006
  • M.S., Carnegie Mellon University 2003
  • B.A., Harvard University 2001

Farfel, J., and V. Conitzer. “A multiagent turing test based on a prediction market.” Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2 (January 1, 2009): 1435–36.

Anand, S. S., R. Bunescu, V. Carvcdho, J. Chomicki, V. Conitzer, M. T. Cox, V. Dignum, et al. “AAAI 2008 workshop reports.” Ai Magazine 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 108–18. https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2196. Full Text

Conitzer, V., J. Lang, and L. Xia. “How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?.” Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 1, 2009, 103–8.

Wagman, L., and V. Conitzer. “Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 29, 2008): 190–95.

Xia, L., V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. “Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 24, 2008): 202–7.

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders.” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1 (December 24, 2008): 196–201.

Xia, L., and V. Conitzer. “Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.” Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, December 1, 2008, 109–18. https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386811. Full Text

Conitzer, V. “Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.” 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2008, December 1, 2008.

Conitzer, V. “Metareasoning as a formal computational problem.” Aaai Workshop  Technical Report WS-08-07 (December 1, 2008): 29–33.

Letchford, J., V. Conitzer, and K. Jain. “An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 5385 LNCS (December 1, 2008): 696–707. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_75. Full Text

Pages

Conitzer, Vincent, Jérôme Lang, and Tuomas Sandholm. “How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?.” In Tark, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern and Moshe Tennenholtz, 201–14. ACM, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents..” In Icml, edited by Tom Fawcett and Nina Mishra, 83–90. AAAI Press, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games..” In Icml, edited by Tom Fawcett and Nina Mishra, 91–98. AAAI Press, 2003.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness..” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 392–97. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates..” In Aaai/Iaai, edited by Rina Dechter, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard S. Sutton, 314–19. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2002.

Conitzer, Vincent, and Tuomas Sandholm. “Complexity of Mechanism Design..” In Uai, edited by Adnan Darwiche and Nir Friedman, 103–10. Morgan Kaufmann, 2002.

Pages