SYLLABUS: ECONOMICS 705-I, SPRING 2019

Course:	Economics 705-I (Bayesian Games)
Instructor:	Prof Curtis Taylor.
Time:	Tuesday and Thursday, 1:25–2:40.
Location:	SS136.
Office:	SS315.
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Office Hours:	Thursday 3:00–5:00 or by appointment.
Exam:	February 21 18:00–21:00 in SS136.

The texts for this half of the course are *Microeconomic Theory* by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (Micro) and *Game Theory* by Fudenberg and Tirole (Games). Other useful books include: *Game Theory for Applied Economists* by Gibbons, *A Course in Game Theory* by Osborne and Rubinstein, *The Economics of Contracts: A Primer* by Salanie, and *Auction Theory* by Krishna. I will post notes on Sakai so that you can follow along during the lectures. Please print the notes and bring them to class.

Your grade will be determined by aggregating your performance on each half of the course. The primary determinant of your grade on the first half of the course will be your score on an exam. Problem sets will also be collected and graded as: 2 (serious effort), 1 (not very serious effort) or 0 (not handed in). Problem sets are due on Wednesday at 18:00 according to the following schedule: PS7=Jan16, PS8=Jan23, PS9=Jan30, PS10=Feb6, PS11=Feb13, PS12=Feb20. You may hand in your problem set at the beginning of the TA session or by placing it in the TAs mailbox by 18:00. Late assignments will not be accepted. You may work together with other students on solving problems, but every student must turn in his/her own solutions. So that all students have equal access, the answers to all problem sets used in previous years will be posted on Sakai. You are *strongly* encouraged to attempt the problem sets without first consulting the answers. The exam will be closed-notes, closed-books, and eyes-on-own-test!

Lectures and Reading Schedule

TOPIC	DATES	MICRO	GAMES	NOTES
Bayesian Games	Jan. 10	8.E	6.1 - 6.5	lec12
Bayesian Mechanism Design	Jan. 16	14.C, 23.B	7.1.1	lec13
Self-selection and Monopolistic Screening	Jan. 17	14.C, 23.B	7.1.1	lec13
Ex Post Private Information	Jan. 22	23D–E	none	lec14
Intro to Auction Theory	Jan. 24	None	none	lec15
Equivalent and Optimal Auctions	Jan. 29	23F	7.5.1	lec16
The (simple) VCG Mechanism	Jan. 31	23C	7.4.3	lec17
Adverse Selection	Feb. 5	13.A, 13.D	none	lec18
Dynamic Bayesian Games	Feb. 7	7.C	8.2.1	Lec19
Signaling	Feb. 12	13.C	8.2.2	lec19
Screening and Bargaining	Feb. 15	none	10.2.1, 10.2.2	lec21
Reputation	Feb. 19	none	9.2.1, 9.2.2	lec 22