School Choice and the Housing Market

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Abstract

I develop a unified framework with schools and residential choices to study

the welfare and distributional consequences of public schools' switching from the

traditional neighborhood assignment to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism. I

show that when families receive higher priorities at neighborhood schools, the

Deferred Acceptance mechanism improves aggregate or average welfare compared

to neighborhood assignment. Additionally, Deferred Acceptance improves the

welfare of lowest-income families, both with and without neighborhood priorities.

My work lays theoretical foundations for analyzing general assignment games

with externalities.

Keywords: school choice, Deferred Acceptance, neighborhoods assignment,

welfare, lowest-income families, externalities

JEL Codes: D47, D61, D63, C60, I24, I28

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