

# Whom Should the Taxman Visit? Evidence from Door-to-Door Tax Enforcement in Indonesia\*

Work in progress – please see the latest version [here](#)

Paulo Antonacci<sup>†</sup>

Muhammad Khudadad Chattha<sup>‡</sup>

**Abstract:** In this paper we study the effects and optimal design of a large-scale tax-nudging campaign in Indonesia, where officials conducted door-to-door visits to more than 30,000 property owners. To estimate the program’s average and heterogeneous impact on property-tax compliance, we propose a pseudo-treatment causal forest estimator. We find that visits increased payment rates by an average of 7.8 p.p., with effects persisting for at least four subsequent years and being particularly pronounced among lower-value properties. We then use individualized treatment-effect estimates—rather than conventional compliance risk scores—to design targeting strategies that answer “Who should the taxman visit?” The optimal targeting depends on a prioritization induced by policy objective: A participation-maximizing objective, which seeks to induce the largest number of taxpayers to comply, prioritizes lower-value properties and delivers meaningful gains in both participation and revenue. A revenue-maximizing objective directs visits toward higher-value properties, generating substantial fiscal returns with little change in the number of payers. By contrast, a standard risk-based rule that targets likely noncompliers is effectively neutral—allocating effort broadly across the value distribution. However, it yields no discernible improvements in either revenue or participation. These results suggest that risk-based prioritization is ill-suited to nudging contexts and make explicit the equity–efficiency trade-offs inherent in algorithmic targeting for tax enforcement.

**Keywords:** Tax Compliance, Behavioral Nudges, Causal Forest, Policy Learning

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<sup>†</sup>Duke University

<sup>‡</sup>World Bank