

## Introduction

Against the background of international commitment to the Millennium Development **Goal (MDGs) for the** universalization of primary education, my research investigates the effectiveness of public spending on primary education outcomes in three states in India



# Unit of analysis

**Analysis at the district level - the lowest** viable spatial units for initiating and implementing decentralized planning in India

### Why?

**Different districts, even within the same state,** have different characteristics and require unique developmental approaches.

**State-level analysis is far too broad to** accurately determine the micro determinants of educational outcomes

# Data and methodology

### Data

Data for 115 districts across three states in India – Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka – for the years 2006 and 2007

### **Models**

- **1)Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)**
- **2)Fixed effects with state dummies**
- **3)Fixed effects with state dummies and** interaction terms

### Why?

The fixed effects model is useful because it adjusts for all fixed (or time-invariant) sources of heterogeneity between subjects that might bias the model results if they were not properly controlled.

### **Drawback**

The drawback is that the coefficients of timeinvariant variables like (i)%urban population, (ii) % scheduled caste population, and (iii) % *literate adults* cannot be estimated.

However, these can be included in the analysis through interaction terms.









expenditure

outcomes

significant

"Illiteracy and innumeracy are forms of insecurity in themselves. Not to be able to read or write or count or communicate is a tremendous deprivation." – Nobel laureate Amartya Sen

## Is public expenditure on primary education effective? Evidence from districts across India

By **Tara lyer** 

### **Regression model Educational outcomes studied Controls used Interaction terms** •Net enrollment rate (NER) Primary education expenditure per student •Transition rates •Per capita Income (PCI) •Performance on exams (Percent of boys / girls who Percent public schools received more than 60% Student-teacher ratio in examinations in grade V) population Controls Outcomes $Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 expen_{i,t} + \beta_2 pci_{i,t} + \beta_3 pergov_{i,t} + \beta_4 str_{i,t} + \beta_4 str$ $\beta_5$ expendit <sub>i,t</sub> + $\beta_6$ expencaste <sub>i,t</sub> + $\beta_7$ strurban <sub>i,t</sub> + $\alpha_i$ + u <sub>i,t</sub> Interaction terms Results Summary of outcomes using the fixed effects model Performance in Exams Girls Transition Rate NER Boys Expenditure per Primary School Student (in logs)\* UP dummy

Positive \*\*

Negative\*\*\*

Positive\*

Positive \*

Positive\*\*

Negative\*\*\*

Positive\*\*

- Expenditure per Primary School Student (in logs) \*AP dummy
- **Expenditure per Primary School Student** (in logs)\* Karnataka dummy
- Per Capita Income (in logs)
- Percent Public Schools
- Student-Teacher Ratio
- Expenditure per Primary School Student (in logs) \* Percent Literate Adults
- Per Capita Income (in logs) \* Percent Urban Population
- Student-teacher Ratio \* Percent Scheduled Caste Population
- t-statistics in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1
- Increased primary educational spending not effective to improve outcomes
- But increased literacy levels can increase efficacy of
- •Per capita income significant for some outcomes
- Decreasing student-teacher ratio does not improve
- Lower ratios of public to private primary schools very







 Expenditure per primary school student (in logs) \* percent overall literacy

•Per capita income (in logs) \* percent urban population

 Student-teacher ratio \* percent scheduled caste

Negative\* Negative\*

Perstuden Fitted values 95% CI STR

Though student-teacher ratios decrease with increased spending on education, this does not result in better educational outcomes

## **Comparison with other studies**

•Several previous studies indicate that expenditure is not effective unless it is accompanied by increased community support, parental involvement and teacher monitoring

•Some papers find that the quality of primary education is better in private schools ,and that private primary students have better outcomes

•Reducing the student teacher ratio has no effect unless teachers are better monitored and/or offered incentives to teach properly. Kremer et al (2004) find that 25% of teachers in India are absent on any given day, and of those present, only half actually teach. The rest drink tea and socialize! They have little or no incentive since they earn tenure early as government school teachers

## **Policy recommendations**

 Public-private partnerships should be considered, as should contracting more primary schools to private institutions

- School voucher systems like in the US
- •Subsidies to poor parents
- •Free midday meals
- Local workshops to activate community support and involve parents
- •But main focus should be on making *existing* expenditure more efficient

 Future research needs to be conduced on the relative costs and benefits of the numerous government initiatives in primary education

### References

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Kremer, K., Muralidharan, K., Chaudhury, N. Hammer, J. and Rogers F.H. (2005). Teacher absence in India: A snapshot. Journal of the *European Economic Association*, *3*(2), 658-667.

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